State v. Jones Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 44994 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-24-2017
State v. Jones Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44994
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation




State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7259





IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44994
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR-16-22597
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Steven Robert Jones appeals from the district court’s Judgment and Sentence.  Mr. Jones
was sentenced to a unified sentence of five years, with three and one-half years fixed, for his
eluding conviction.  Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
him to an excessive sentence without giving proper weight and consideration to the mitigating
factors present in this case.  Furthermore, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On December 28, 2016, an Information was filed charging Mr. Jones with eluding,
driving under the influence, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.35-37.)  The charges
were the result of a report to police that an individual was driving into oncoming traffic.  (PSI,
p.4.)1  When officers located the driver and attempted to stop the vehicle, the driver did not stop.
(PSI, p.4.)  The vehicle was eventually stopped when it struck another vehicle.  (PSI, p.4.)  Later,
Mr. Jones admitted that he had used methamphetamine the previous evening and a pipe was
found on his person.  (PSI, p.4.)
An Amended Information was filed, charging only eluding and driving under the
influence.   (R.,  pp.42-43.)   Mr.  Jones  entered  guilty  pleas  to  the  charges  in  the  Amended
Information.  (R., pp.38-39.)  At sentencing, the prosecution recommended the imposition of a
fixed five year sentence.  (Tr. 3/3/17, p.20, Ls.3-6.)  Defense counsel requested that Mr. Jones be
placed on probation or given the opportunity to complete a period of retained jurisdiction.
(Tr. 3/3/17, p.23, Ls.10-13.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 5 years, with 3 ½
years fixed, for the eluding conviction, and 98 days, for the driving under the influence
conviction.  (R., pp.50, 53-54.)  Mr. Jones filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment
and Sentence.  (R., pp.61-63.)
Mr. Jones also filed a timely Rule 35 Motion.  (Augmentation: Motion for Reduction of
Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35.)  The motion was denied.  (Augmentation: Order Denying
Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion.)
1 For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
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ISSUES
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Jones, a unified
sentence of five years, with three and one-half years fixed, following his plea of guilty to
eluding?




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Jones, A Unified Sentence
Of Five Years, With Three And One-Half Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To Eluding
Mr. Jones asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years, with
three and one-half years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Jones does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Jones must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
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of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
Appellate courts use a three-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion:  (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2)
whether  the  court  acted  within  the  outer  boundaries  of  its  discretion  and  consistently  with  the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008) (citing Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).
Mr. Jones asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and consideration to
the mitigating factors that exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an
exercise  of  reason.   Specifically,  he  asserts  that  the  district  court  failed  to  give  proper
consideration  to  his  admitted  substance  abuse  problem  and  desire  for  treatment.   Idaho  courts
have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89 (1982).
Mr. Jones first used alcohol at the age of nine.  (PSI, p.20.)  He first tried marijuana and
began consuming alcohol regularly at the age of 10.  (PSI, pp.19-20.)  As a teenager he began
using methamphetamines and hallucinogens.  (PSI, p.19.)  Mr. Jones relapsed prior to his current
offense.   (PSI,  p.20.)   He  will  need  additional  treatment  to  maintain  sobriety  and  it  was
recommended that he participate in Level II Intensive Outpatient treatment.  (PSI, p.37.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
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573, 581 (1999).  Mr. Jones has been previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder, paranoid
delusional schizophrenia, and antisocial personality disorder.  (PSI, p.19.)  In a 2017 evaluation,
it was noted that Mr. Jones was also suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder and generalized
anxiety disorder.  (PSI, pp.35, 39.)  He notes that his mental health issues present a “daily
struggle.”  (PSI, p.20.)  He would like to participate in mental health counseling to see if it could
help.  (PSI, p.20.)
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court
noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court’s
decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Jones has the support of family and
friends.   He  provided  the  district  court  with  letters  of  support  from the  Ritz  family;  his  sister,
Laura Westlake; and his mother, Sheryl Osborn.   (PSI, pp.27, 29, 30.)  Ms. Westlake wrote that
she is “here to emotionally support my bother in his recovery,” noted that he would be employed
upon release, and ask that the court consider that their aging parents need for Mr. Jones’ care.
(PSI, p.29.)
Additionally, Mr. Jones has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense.  In
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence
imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his
problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Id.
121 Idaho at 209.  Mr. Jones has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense
stating:
I would like to express how regretful I am that my actions endangered people and
I  am  happy  that  no  one  was  injured.  I  am  truely  [sic]  sorry  for  my  actions  and
accept full  responsibility for what I  am here for today. I  just  ask that you take a
look at me and see just how ready I am to change my life. I know that my drug
use had a lot to do with why I am here and I know what I need to do to change. I
am willing and able to make these changes in my life. . . .
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(PSI, p.21.)  In completing the PSI, he also noted that he was “very glad that no one was hurt.”
(PSI,  p.5.)   At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jones made a lengthy statement to the district  court
noting that he had two jobs waiting for him upon his release, apologizing to the owner of the
vehicle he damaged, discussed how this incident changed his life, expressed his desire to be with
his parents at the end of their lives, his desire to participate in treatment, and requesting an
opportunity to prove himself in the community.  (Tr. 3/3/17, p.25, L.10 – p.33, L.18.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his substance abuse, desire for treatment, mental health issues, friend and
family support, and remorse, it would have crafted a less severe sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Jones’s Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447
(Ct. App. 1984)).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the
same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. (citing
Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  In order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Jones must show that in light of
7
the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Mr. Jones asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and consideration to
the new information provided in support of his Rule 35 motion and the mitigating factors that
exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Mr. Jones supplied additional information to the district court in the form of two letters, a
copy of a kite requesting treatment, and testimony at the Rule 35 hearing.  (R., pp.60. 70-71;
Augmentation: Notice of Filing of Additional Materials for Rule 35; Tr. 7/717, p.6, L.8 – p.7,
L.7.)  Specifically, Mr. Jones noted that he desperately needed programming and asked that his
sentence be modified to allow him into programing earlier.  (R., p.60.)  At the Rule 35 hearing,
Mr. Jones testified that he had been trying to get into programing and treatment while in custody,
but had been unable to do because of his parole eligibility date.  (Tr. 7/717, p.6, L.8 – p.7, L.7.)
In one of his letters, he noted that, “. . . I know I have made a complete mess of my life
and I am truely [sic] sorry and am ashamed of myself.  I also know that the burden of this lays at
my feet alone and only I can do what it takes to turn my life around. . . . I do not want to be stuck
in the cycle of just being locked up without any rehabilitation, treatment or programing.”
(R., p.71.)  He also wrote that he had a sober living arrangement and employment set up for
when he is released and reminded the court of his involvement in the “Genesis Process.”
(R., pp.70-71.)
8
Mr. Jones asserts that in light of the above additional information and the mitigating
factors mentioned in section I, which need not be repeated, but are incorporated by reference, the
district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.  Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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